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Fighting Poverty with Labor Demand Policies
In my new book, Jobs for the Poor: Can Labor Demand Policies Help?, I argue that U.S.
antipoverty policy would be more effective with a more balanced use of labor demand and supply
policies.  Current U.S. policy overemphasizes labor supply policies.  The book suggests new labor
demand policies to increase both overall labor demand and labor demand for the poor.
Labor supply policies directly interact with the poor to increase their labor supply, job skills,
or wages.  Examples of labor supply policies include welfare reform, job training, and the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC).  Labor demand policies directly interact with employers to affect the
number of poor persons hired.  Examples of labor demand policies include public works programs
of the 1930s, public service jobs funded by the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA) during the 1970s, and tax credits for employers hiring the disadvantaged (1970s to the
present).   
What are the arguments for greater use of labor demand policies?  The first is that despite the
economic boom of the 1990s,  more jobs are still needed by America’s poor.  For example, in order
for each poor, non-elderly U.S. household to have one full-time, full-year worker, we would need 9
million more full-time, full-year jobs.  Employment rates for low-education groups are still low
compared to past norms.  For example, suppose our goal was to increase the employment rates of
all working-age heads of households without a college degree to the employment rate that similar
white males experienced in 1979.  Achieving this goal would require 5 million more jobs.
A second argument for labor demand policies is that labor supply policies by themselves have
significant limitations.  One limitation is that it is difficult or expensive (either financially or socially)
for labor supply policies to cause large increases in the employment of the poor.  Welfare reform has
pushed over a million persons into the labor force, but 40 percent of these new labor force entrants
are not employed, which is a significant social cost.  Job training programs have benefits that exceed
their modest costs, but their benefits are also modest (an increase in earnings of perhaps $1000
annually per trainee).  Wage supplements to the poor such as the EITC help many working Americans
out of poverty but usually only have modest effects in increasing employment; for example, the EITC
has increased employment by at most one-half million persons. 
A further limitation of labor supply policies is that they cause displacement effects.  When
labor supply increases, labor demand does not instantly go up by the same amount.  As a result, some
jobs obtained by the new labor force participants result in fewer job openings for others. For example,
estimates suggest that for every 10 jobs obtained by former welfare recipients, 3 to 7 jobs are lost by
other less-educated workers.  
A third argument for labor demand policies is that aggregate demand policies are necessary
but insufficient to solve poverty.  Estimates suggest that a 1 percent lower unemployment rate will
lower the poverty rate by 0.3 percent to 0.9 percent, which would bring 0.9 million to 2.6 million
people out ofpoverty; yet unemployment rates cannot be lowered sufficiently to solve poverty.  In
1999, the U.S. unemployment rate was 4.2 percent and poverty was 11.8 percent.  Even lowering
unemployment to zero would not eliminate poverty.
A fourth argument is that targeted demand programs can be effective.  Over the years, the
United States has experimented with a number of programs that hire targeted low-employment
groups for public service jobs or subsidized jobs with private employers.  During the subsidy period,
these programs typically result in huge increases in employment rates.  It is common for the earnings
or employment of the target group to increase by 60 percent or more of the earnings and employment
subsidized by the program (see Table 1).  This means that these programs are effective in identifying
individuals who otherwise ould have been jobless.  These targeted demand programs also usually
yield jobs that are productive; employers often are surprised at the high productivity of these
subsidized hires.
Table 1  In-Program Impacts of                    
              Subsidized Jobs Programs
Program Ratioa
Supported Work (1970s) 0.79
Youth Incentive
Entitlement Pilot Projects
(1970s)
0.61
Youth Corps (1990s) 0.57
New Hope (1990s) 0.68
Summer Youth Jobs 0.67
aThis ratio shows the estimated net impact of the
program on the employment and earnings of program
participants during the period in which subsidized
employment was provided divided by the employment or
earnings directly provided by the program.
SOURCE: Bartik, Timothy J. 2001. Jobs for the Poor:
Can Labor Demand Policies Help? Table 7.1, p. 182.
Targeted emand programs can cause significant earnings increases that persist long after the
subsidy period.  For example, the Supported Work program of the late 1970s yielded increases in
earnings for former welfare recipients of about 25 percent of in-program earnings that persisted
largely unchanged for at least eight years after the program.  Why does short-run subsidized
employment have long-run earnings effects?  A plausible explanation is that a well- run subsidized
jobs program increases workers’ “soft" job skills.  Soft skills include, for example, showing up at
work consistently and getting along with supervisors, co-workers, and customers.  Studies suggest
that problems with soft skills explain why many disadvantaged workers lose their jobs.  Soft skills are
difficult to teach in a classroom; they are better learned through a supportive job experience.   
What specific labor demand policies do I recommend?  First, I recommend that the United
States permanently enact a revised version of the New Jobs Tax Credit that was in place in 1977 and
1978.  This revised tax credit  would provide subsidies to all employers that expanded overall
employment (not just jobs for the poor) above some baseline level if they are located in high-
unemployment local labor markets.  This subsidy would be credited against payroll taxes (the Social
Security and Medicare trust funds would be reimbursed from general revenues, so the subsidy would
encourage employment expansion by all employers: for-profit, non-profit, and public).  In periods of
low national unemployment such as we have now recently experienced, this tax credit would only
apply to the few high-unemployment areas.  Research shows that geographically targeting labor
demand increases on high-unemployment local labor markets reduces inflationary pressures; but, if
the U.S. economy went into a prolonged recession, the revised New Jobs Tax Credit would apply
nationwide.  Studies suggest that such a credit might offset about one- fourth of the normal job loss
caused by a recession. 
Second, I recommend we adopt a revised version of the MEED program used by the state of
Minnesota in the 1980s.  Local workforce boards would, on a discretionary basis, award wage
subsidies to selected employers that hired selected individuals from disadvantaged groups.  The
subsidies could go to either public or private employers.  To reduce displacement of current workers,
the subsidies could only go for newly created jobs.  The subsidies would be targeted on individuals
in poverty who are unlikely to find a steady job on their own, based on their own past history and the
results of a trial job search.  The subsidy period would be no more than six months, which is sufficient
to provide training in soft skills.  Preference in awarding subsidies would go to employers that can
provide good on-the-job training in both soft and "hard" skills and that are willing to “roll over”
subsidized hires into permanent jobs with some prospect for advancement.
Discretionary control of this program by local boards is a crucial distinction from our current
tax subsidies to employers hiring the disadvantaged.  Our current program is an entitlement that goes,
for example, to many restaurants for hiring workers they would have hired anyway.  Under a
discretionary program, the wage subsidies can be more carefully targeted on both workers and
employers.  Wage subsidies should be limited to persons unlikely to find steady work in other ways
and to employers that are willing to change hiring practices and provide career opportunities to those
who are hard to employ. 
Running these two demand programs at a level sufficient to make a large difference to poverty
would require tens of billions of dollars per year in additional government spending or tax credits.
However, no realistic antipoverty policy is cheap.  The aggregate poverty gap in the United
States—the difference between the incomes of the poor and the income needed to be out of
poverty—is $65 billion annually.  Are we serious in promoting employment as a solution to poverty?
If so,  we must commit the resources needed to significantly increase the employment and earnings
of the poor.
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